Understanding Meta Ethics and Its Core Divisions

Meta ethics isn't about telling you what's right or wrong - that's the job of normative theories like utilitarianism or Kantian ethics. Instead, it examines what we actually mean when we use moral language and whether statements like "stealing is wrong" can be true or false.

The field splits into two major camps: cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Cognitivists believe moral statements are meaningful and can be either true or false - they're making factual claims about the world. Non-cognitivists argue the opposite: moral statements aren't factual at all, but express emotions or attitudes instead.

Naturalism represents one major cognitivist approach, arguing that moral properties like "goodness" can be defined through natural qualities we observe in the world. Think of how utilitarians define "good" as pleasure or how natural law theorists see goodness in fulfilling our natural purpose.

Quick Check: If someone says "helping others is good," naturalists would say this statement can be verified by looking at natural evidence - perhaps because helping creates happiness or fulfils our social nature.

Naturalism: Finding Morality in the Natural World

Naturalism takes the bold stance that moral truths exist as absolute facts in the natural world, discoverable through empirical observation. When naturalists say "Thomas was a good man," they believe this can be proven true or false by examining real evidence about Thomas's actions and character.

Several major philosophers support this view through different approaches. Aquinas argued that God built moral values into the natural order - we discover goodness by understanding our divine purpose and following natural moral law. Aristotle similarly believed all things have a telos (final cause), and something becomes "good" when it fulfils its natural purpose.

Bentham's utilitarianism offers another naturalistic approach, identifying "good" with natural qualities like pleasure and happiness. We can objectively measure what causes the most happiness in any situation, making moral decisions factual rather than subjective.

However, naturalism faces serious challenges. Hume's is/ought problem points out the logical gap between observing facts ("he killed someone") and making moral judgements ("killing is wrong"). Moore's naturalistic fallacy questions why we should assume natural things are automatically good - after all, disease and suffering are also natural.

Think About It: If naturalism is correct, then moral disagreements should be solvable through evidence and observation - just like scientific disputes.

Intuitionism: Knowing Good Through Moral Vision

Intuitionism agrees with naturalism that objective moral truths exist, but argues we don't discover them through observation - we simply know them intuitively. According to intuitionists, moral truths are self-evident to anyone with a developed moral sense.

G.E. Moore pioneered this approach, arguing that "good" is like the colour yellow - it's a simple, indefinable concept that you either recognise or you don't. Just as you can't explain yellow to someone who's never seen it, you can't define goodness in terms of anything else. Moore believed people have a kind of "moral vision" that allows them to intuit what's right.

H.A. Prichard extended this theory to include our sense of obligation and duty. He argued we intuitively recognise moral duties like promise-keeping and honesty, though we might face conflicts when different obligations compete with each other.

W.D. Ross developed this further with his theory of prima facie duties - fundamental obligations like fidelity, gratitude, justice, and avoiding harm that we recognise as obviously right in most situations.

The strength of intuitionism is that it explains why certain moral truths seem universal and why some people appear "morally blind" to obvious wrongs. However, critics argue that if moral intuition were real, why do people's moral judgements differ so dramatically across cultures and individuals?

Real-World Connection: Intuitionists would say your immediate horror at hearing about child abuse isn't learned - it's an intuitive recognition of moral truth.

Emotivism: Morality as Personal Expression

Emotivism completely rejects the idea that moral statements express facts or truths. Instead, when you say "murder is wrong," you're simply expressing your emotional disapproval - like saying "murder - boo!" It's not meaningful in any factual sense.

A.J. Ayer developed this theory using the verification principle, which states that meaningful statements must be verifiable through observation or logic. Since moral statements can't be verified scientifically, they're essentially meaningless expressions of personal emotion rather than factual claims.

Charles Stevenson refined emotivism by arguing that moral statements do more than just express feelings - they attempt to influence others' attitudes. When you say "stealing is wrong," you're really saying "I disapprove of stealing, and you should too." Moral disagreements aren't about facts, but about conflicting attitudes based on different fundamental beliefs.

This theory connects to Hume's is/ought distinction - the idea that you can't logically jump from factual observations ("he stole money") to value judgements ("stealing is wrong"). Facts and values occupy completely separate domains.

Emotivism promotes tolerance since no one can claim their moral views are objectively true. However, it struggles with the problem of moral relativism - if emotions determine morality, then a racist's approval of discrimination would be equally "valid" as your disapproval of it.

Consider This: If emotivism is correct, then moral education isn't about teaching truths, but about shaping emotional responses and attitudes.

The Realism Debate: Do Moral Facts Exist?

The ultimate question in meta ethics boils down to moral realism versus moral anti-realism. Do moral facts actually exist in the world, waiting to be discovered, or do we simply create moral rules through our attitudes and decisions?

Moral realists (including naturalists and intuitionists) believe moral properties are real features of the world. When they say "murder is wrong," they're claiming that wrongness is an actual property of murder, just like redness is a property of roses.

Moral anti-realists (like emotivists) argue there are no moral facts at all. Moral statements might feel meaningful to us, but they don't refer to objective features of reality - they're expressions of our subjective attitudes and preferences.

J.L. Mackie's error theory presents a third option: moral statements try to describe objective facts, but they're always false because no moral facts exist. When people make moral claims, they're making a systematic error - speaking as if moral facts exist when they don't.

Mackie argues that if moral facts existed, they'd need to be intrinsically motivating and action-guiding for everyone. But moral rules often fail to motivate people who lack personal reasons to follow them, suggesting they're not objective features of reality.

The debate has practical implications: if moral realism is false, can we maintain social cooperation and justify moral criticism of practices like oppression or genocide?

Food for Thought: Your instinctive belief that some things are objectively wrong might be the strongest evidence for moral realism - or the greatest illusion.

Connecting Meta Ethics to Normative Theories

Understanding meta ethics helps you grasp the foundations of the normative theories you've studied. Each normative approach implicitly takes a position on whether moral facts exist and how we access them.

Kantian ethics operates from a cognitivist, realist position - Kant believed moral duties are objective facts discovered through reason. His categorical imperative assumes universal moral truths that apply to all rational beings regardless of personal desires or cultural differences.

Utilitarianism typically embraces naturalism, defining "good" in terms of observable consequences like happiness or pleasure. Mill and Bentham treated moral decisions as factual questions about which actions produce the best outcomes for the greatest number.

Situation ethics presents more complexity - while it emphasises the absolute principle of agape (love), it applies this relativistically to each situation. This creates tension between its deontological foundation $duty-based$ and its consequentialist application $outcome-focused$.

The classification of these theories matters for understanding their strengths and weaknesses. Absolutist theories like natural law claim universal moral truths, while relativist approaches like situation ethics allow moral rules to vary by context.

Cultural relativism raises additional questions: if moral beliefs differ dramatically across societies, does this prove there are no universal moral facts, or simply that some cultures have better access to moral truth than others?

Exam Tip: Always consider the meta-ethical assumptions behind any normative theory you're evaluating - it often reveals the theory's deepest strengths and vulnerabilities.