Scope and Exceptions to the Right to Life

Article 2 of the ECHR provides robust protection for the right to life, but it also recognizes specific circumstances where the use of lethal force may be justified. Understanding these exceptions is crucial for comprehending the full scope of this fundamental right.

The text outlines three main exceptions where deprivation of life may not violate Article 2:

1. Self-defense or defense of others from unlawful violence
2. Effecting a lawful arrest or preventing escape of a lawfully detained person
3. Quelling a riot or insurrection

Example: In the case of Armani Da Silva, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) aligned the test for justified use of force more closely with English law on self-defense, adopting a more subjective approach.

The concept of "necessary force" is central to the application of these exceptions. States and their agents must consider whether the level of force used is absolutely necessary in a given situation. If a situation could have been resolved without resorting to lethal force, the use of such force may breach Article 2.

Highlight: The state has a responsibility to ensure that all professionals who may be in situations requiring the use of force are properly trained, instructed, and given strict guidance on the use of lethal force.

Key cases that have shaped the interpretation of necessary force include:

• McCann: Established a test for assessing the use of force based on an honest belief perceived for good reasons, valid at the time but potentially mistaken later (combining subjective and objective elements)
• Nachova: The Court emphasized that it cannot be necessary to put human life at risk if the person poses no threat to life or limb
• Stewart: Determined that the force used was absolutely necessary
• Gulec: Found that excessive force was used and was not necessary

Quote: "Breach A2 if situation could've been resolved without use of lethal force"

These cases demonstrate the ECtHR's careful balancing act between recognizing legitimate state interests in maintaining order and protecting the fundamental right to life.

Beginning of Life and Unborn Child

The application of Article 2 to the beginning of life and the status of the unborn child is a complex and often contentious issue. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has taken a nuanced approach, allowing individual states a significant margin of appreciation in determining when life begins and how to protect it.

Key points regarding the beginning of life and the unborn child:

1. The ECtHR has not definitively stated when the right to life begins, leaving this decision to individual states.
2. An unborn child is not considered a "person" under Article 2, but the mother's rights are protected.
3. States have discretion in regulating abortion within certain limits.

Example: In Vo v France, the Court held that the question of when the right to life begins is to be decided at the national level, recognizing the diversity of views on this sensitive issue across Europe.

The case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman further illustrates the Court's approach. While not directly addressing the right to abortion, it focused on the right to information:

Highlight: The Court found that providing women with information about abortion services abroad did not infringe Article 2, but rather concerned Article 10 (freedom of expression), as it did not promote or advocate for abortions.

In the UK context, the legal framework surrounding the beginning of life includes:

• The definition of personhood beginning when a baby takes at least one breath outside the womb
• The Abortion Act 1967, which allows legal abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy
• Provisions for abortion without time limits in cases of serious threat to the woman's life or fetal abnormalities

Vocabulary: Fetal abnormalities: Structural or functional anomalies in the developing fetus that may affect its viability or quality of life after birth.

This legal framework is considered compatible with Article 2 and falls within the margin of appreciation granted to states by the ECtHR. It reflects the delicate balance between protecting potential life and respecting women's rights and health.

End of Life and Right to Die

The application of Article 2 to end-of-life issues presents complex ethical and legal challenges. While the right to life is fundamental, questions arise about its scope in relation to quality of life, personal autonomy, and the right to die with dignity. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has addressed these issues in several landmark cases, while allowing states a margin of appreciation in regulating end-of-life decisions.

Key aspects of end-of-life issues under Article 2:

1. States must have legislation to protect everyone's right to life.
2. Suicide, assisted suicide, and euthanasia fall within the margin of appreciation of individual states.
3. The UK law prohibits aiding suicide, but allows for certain end-of-life decisions.

Highlight: The case of Lambert v France demonstrated that national authorities must ensure end-of-life decisions comply with both domestic legislation and the ECHR.

UK legal framework for end-of-life decisions:

• The Suicide Act of 1961 decriminalized suicide but maintained the illegality of assisting suicide.
• Individuals can sign Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders and appoint lasting powers of attorney for health decisions.
• End-of-life areas considered compatible with Article 2 include:
  • Euthanasia
  • Assisted dying
  • Mercy killing
  • Withdrawal of treatment
  • Switching off life-support machines

Definition: Euthanasia: The painless killing of a person suffering from an incurable and painful disease or in an irreversible coma.

Significant cases shaping the interpretation of Article 2 in end-of-life contexts:

1. Pretty v UK: The Court held that the right to life does not include a right to die, emphasizing that quality of life does not determine the right to life.

2. Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust: Recognized the fundamental right to determine what shall be done with one's own body, including the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.

3. R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions: Led to the publication of guidelines in 2010 providing some flexibility in prosecuting assisted suicide cases.

4. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland: Raised questions about when artificial life support should be discontinued for patients in persistent vegetative states.

5. R v Malcherek and R v Steel: Established that switching off life support does not constitute a new intervening act in law and set out a test for determining brain stem death as a criterion for withdrawing life support.

Quote: "The right to life is not determined by quality of life" - ECtHR in Pretty v UK

These cases illustrate the evolving interpretation of Article 2 in relation to end-of-life issues, balancing the state's duty to protect life with individuals' rights to personal autonomy and dignity in death. The legal framework continues to develop as societies grapple with these complex ethical and moral questions.